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AI planning systems tend to be disembodied and are not situated within the environment
for which plans are generated, thus losing information concerning the interaction between
the system and its environment. This paper argues that such information may potentially
be valuable in constraining plan formulation, and presents both an agent- and domain-
independent architecture that extends the classical AI planning framework to take into
account context, or the interaction between an autonomous situated planning agent and
its environment. The paper describes how context constrains the goals an agent might
generate, enables those goals to be prioritised, and constrains plan selection.
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1. Introduction
Recently, the AI planning community has become increasingly interested in in-
vestigating dierent plan evaluation metrics to guide the search behaviour of var-
ious planning systems. This interest has been inuenced by the development of
PDDL2.1 7, a planning domain denition language that was used to specify tem-
poral planning problems for the 3rd International Planning Competition held in
2002. PDDL2.1 allows planning domains both to include actions with duration,
and to represent the consumption and replenishment of resources associated with
action execution using numeric-valued uents. In previous competitions, planning
domains were non-temporal, and resource consumption was not modelled, so that
plan evaluation metrics were essentially based on minimising the number of actions
and the number of outstanding goals. By contrast, modelling time and resources
allows metrics to be developed that examine plan makespan as well as resource
consumption proles.
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The three International Planning Competitions (held in 1998, 2000 and 2002)
have encouraged AI planning research to focus on generating good quality plans
eciently. However, such planners require goals to be independently posed by an
external agent, and there is no information available as to the circumstances that
caused those goals to be generated. In addition, these planners are disembodied
and not situated within the environment for which plans are generated, thus losing
further potential information concerning the interaction between the planning sys-
tem and the environment for which it is planning. In this paper, we argue that such
information may potentially be very valuable in constraining plan formulation, and
present an agent-independent and domain-independent architecture that extends
the classical AI planning framework to take into account context, or the interaction
between an autonomous situated planning agent and its environment. Context is
important as it constrains the goals a planning agent might generate, enables the
agent to prioritise goals, and constrains plan selection. The paper describes both
how context enables an agent to prioritise goals and actions (therefore allowing the
agent to prefer to achieve goals of high priority in favour of those of lower prior-
ity, and to prefer to execute actions of high priority in favour of those of lower
priority), and how aspects of context may be encapsulated in a plan evaluation
metric to direct the search behaviour of a situated planning agent. In Section 2
we describe context in more detail and present motivations. We demonstrate how
motivations enable goals to be generated, how such goals can be prioritised, and
how motivations may play a role in plan evaluation. Section 3 presents a continuous
planning/execution framework, discusses the impact of being able to assign priori-
ties to goals and actions, and describes the way plans can support or undermine an
agent's motivations. Finally, in Section 4 we present conclusions and future work.
2. The Use of Context in Planning
Human, real-world problem-solving involves a degree of subjectivity that has led
researchers such as Picard 23 to investigate the impact of emotions on decision-
making. A key contribution of this paper is to examine how subjectivity, captured
by modelling the context of a planning agent, might aect its plan-generation ca-
pabilities. Now, the context of an autonomous planning agent, captured partly by
representing and reasoning about the motivations of the agent, is important in three
ways: it constrains the goals that the agent might generate; it enables the agent
to prioritise those goals by allocating its resources accordingly; and it enables the
agent to select plans. We dene context to be composed of the following aspects.
 The agent's capabilities which, in AI planning, are represented by action instances
reecting the physical actions the agent is able to perform.
 The environment in which the agent is situated | this includes the current state
of the environment (both internal and external to the agent) as perceived by
the agent, as well as predicted future states of the environment that arise by
executing the actions in the agent's plan.December 8, 2003 18:21 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE ijaitjournalrevised
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 The agent's desires or preferences, which are captured by modelling its motiva-
tions. A motivation is any desire or preference that aects the outcome of a given
reasoning task 11. Motivations will be described further in the following Section.
Of course, what is contextual depends upon an agent's particular sensors,
actuators, size and so on. For example, dierent features within the same envi-
ronment may be pertinent to dierent agents; a human in an oce environment
takes note of objects such as desks and computers, while an insect in the same
environment is perhaps more aware of grains of dust on the carpet. With refer-
ence to articial agents, it is very much a responsibility of the designer to take
into account such factors, as well as the agent's purpose, in order to determine
the appropriate context.
2.1. Motivations
When planning to achieve the same goal, two agents may create dierent plans
even though their external environment is the same. The dierent plans arise as
a result of dierences in the internal states of those agents and can be said to be
due to the motivations of each agent. According to Halliday, the word motivation
does not refer to a specic set of readily identied processes 8 | it is frequently
discussed in terms of drive and incentive. Drives are related to physiological states
such as the deprivation of food, hormones, etc, while incentives refer to external
stimuli that aect motivation such as the presence of food, as an incentive to eat.
Research on motivation is currently being pursued from a variety of perspectives
including psychology and ethology.
Some psychological research has recognised the role of motivations in reasoning
in a similar way to that suggested here. Kunda 11 informally denes motivation to
be, \any wish, desire, or preference that concerns the outcome of a given reasoning
task" and suggests that motivation aects reasoning in a variety of ways including
the accessing, constructing and evaluating of beliefs and evidence, as well as decision
making. Such arguments are supported by a large body of experimental research,
but no attempt is made to address the issue of how motivations may be represented
or applied in a computational context.
Computational work has also recognised the role of motivations. Simon 24 takes
motivation to be \that which controls attention at any given time," and explores
the relation of motivation to information-processing behaviour, but from a cognitive
perspective. Sloman 26;25 has elaborated on Simon's work, showing how motivations
are relevant to emotions and the development of a computational theory of mind.
Problem-solving can be considered to be the task of nding actions that achieve
the current goals. Typically, goals are presented to systems without regard to the
problem-solving agent so that the reasoning process is divorced from the reality
of an agent in the world. Clearly, this is inadequate for research concentrating on
modelling autonomous agents and creatures, which requires an understanding of
how such goals are generated and selected. Additionally, it is inadequate for researchDecember 8, 2003 18:21 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE ijaitjournalrevised
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that aims to provide exibility of reasoning in a variety of contexts, regardless of
concerns with modelling articial agents. Such exibility can be achieved through
the use of motivations which can lead to dierent results even when goals remain
the same 15.
In proposing to develop a `computational architecture of a mind', Sloman makes
explicit mention of the need for a \store of `springs of action' (motives)" 26. In the
same paper, he tries to explicate his notion of a motive as being a representation
used in deciding what to do, including desires, wishes, tastes, preferences and ideals.
The key feature of a motive, according to Sloman, is not in the representation itself,
but its role in processing. Importantly, Sloman distinguishes between motives on
the one hand, and `mere subgoals' on the other. \Sometimes," he claims, \a mere
subgoal comes to be valued as an end," because of a loss of `reason' information.
First-order motives directly specify goals, while second-order motives generate new
motives or resolve conicts between competing motives | they are termed motive
generators and motive comparators. \A motive produced by a motive generator may
have the status of a desire." This relatively early work presents a broad picture of a
two-tiered control of behaviour: motives occupy the top level, providing the drive or
urge to produce the lower level goals that specify the behaviour itself. In subsequent
work, the terminology changes to distinguish between nonderivative motivators
or goals and derivative motivators or goals, rather than between motivators and
goals themselves. Nevertheless, the notion of derivative and nonderivative mental
attitudes makes one point clear: that there are two levels of attitude, one which
is in some sense innate, and which gives rise to the other which is produced as a
result of the rst.
In a dierent context, the second of Waltz's `Eight Principles for Building an
Intelligent Robot' requires the inclusion of \innate drive and evaluation systems to
provide the robot with moment-to-moment guidance for its actions." 28 In elabo-
rating this principle, Waltz explains that the action of a robot at a particular time
should not just be determined by the current sensory inputs, but also the \desires"
of the robot, such as minimizing energy expenditure (laziness), and maintaining
battery power levels (hunger). This research into robotics, articial life, and au-
tonomous agents and creatures has provided the impetus for a growth of interest in
modelling motivations computationally, and a number of dierent representations
for motivations and mechanisms for manipulating them have been developed at
both subsymbolic and symbolic levels (for example 14;9).
While there has been a steady stream of research over the last twenty years, it
is only relatively recently that the incorporation of motivations into eective agent
architectures, for functional purposes, has become more prevalent, for example 5.
Neverthless, the varied research into robotics, articial life, and autonomous agents
and creatures has provided an impetus for a growth of interest in modelling moti-
vations computationally, and a number of dierent representations for motivations
and mechanisms for manipulating them have been developed at both subsymbolic
and symbolic levels (for example 1;9).December 8, 2003 18:21 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE ijaitjournalrevised
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New agent architectures that draw on emotion-cognition interaction are also
now being considered. For example, Oliveira and Sarmento 21 describe an architec-
ture that includes emotion evaluation functions and emotion-based processing to
bias several functional aspects of agent behaviour, including plan granularity and
execution time. Other aspects that are inuenced in this way relate to mood-based
retrieval of information from memory. Marsella and Gratch have also begun to ad-
dress the extension of computational models of emotion to show their impact on
behaviour 16, but this work is still preliminary.
Perhaps the highest prole work that draws on the psychological literature in
emotion, motivation and cognition relates to articial, life-like or believable agents,
in which the focus is on the development of models that are intended to provide
accurate and engaging interaction mechanisms. For example, Lester et al. describe
a full-body emotive pedagogical agent for multimodal interaction 12, while Ball and
Breese consider the impact of emotion and personality on conversational interac-
tion 2. Such work is also relevant to the kind of model considered here, but largely
ignores our core issues of planning and acting without embodiment.
In the prevailing symbolic AI view, an agent may be modelled as having a
set of motivations which, in human terms, represent its basic needs and desires.
Dierent kinds of agent have dierent motivations. In animals, these motivations
might represent drives such as hunger or curiosity, whilst an autonomous truck-
driving agent might have motivations concerned with fuel replenishment, conserve-
fuel, or with preserving the state of the truck's tyres, conserve-tyres. Associated
with each motivation is a measure of strength, or motivational value, which varies
with changing circumstances, and which represents the driving force that directs
action to satisfy the motivation. For example, the motivational value associated with
conserve-fuel might be low just after the truck-driving agent has refuelled but will
gradually increase over time as the agent drives between cities, consuming fuel. The
truck-driving agent only acts to satisfy the motivation when the strength associated
with it is suciently high.a Feedback of information from an agent's environment
causes motivational values to vary | for example, if an agent perceives immediate
danger, the motivational value associated with self-preservation increases to a high
level causing the agent to act.
Context, especially the notion of motivation, is increasingly being seen as a
means of inuencing or constraining particular aspects of behaviour in autonomous
agents. In planning agents, motivations are regarded as important in two particular
areas of interest, goal generation and plan evaluation. Each is considered in turn
aThis example may falsely give the impression that the changing strength associated with motiva-
tions is analogous to the consumption and replenishment of resources. There is a subtle dierence
however | merely modelling the consumption and replenishment of resources does not have an
impact upon an agent's behaviour. In contrast, motivations aect the way an agent acts within
a domain | for example, when the motivational value associated with conserve-fuel is low, the
truck-driving agent acts to conserveits fuel by driving more carefully or by generating a goal to
replenish the fuel.December 8, 2003 18:21 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE ijaitjournalrevised
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below.
2.2. Goal Generation
An important feature of an autonomous planning agent is an ability to generate
goals in order that it may further its aims, either by taking advantage of opportu-
nities that may arise, or by preventing undesirable situations from occurring.
Motivations directly aect the generation of goals | by achieving a goal, an
agent is able to mitigate the motivations that led to the generation of that goal 6.
For example, if the strength associated with hunger lies above some threshold, the
goal of obtaining food might be generated. A plan to achieve the goal is generated
and, once the agent has executed the plan and the goal is satised, the motivational
value associated with hunger is reduced. It is important to distinguish between mo-
tivations and goals | whereas goals are states that an agent wishes to bring about,
or maintain, motivations are preferences that drive the behaviour of agents 6. In
this sense, and similarly to Sloman's dierent levels, we could consider motivations
to be meta-goals.
Norman 20 describes a model of goal generation in which the threshold causing
goals to be generated to satisfy one or more motivations is dynamically adjusted
in response to feedback from the planning sytem. Thus, if the planner is currently
in the process of achieving many (or few) goals, the motivational value threshold
causing goal generation is increased (or decreased). Similarly, Moat & Frijda 18
use a concept which they term `concerns', which are \dispositions to prefer certain
states and/or dislike others". In their model, an agent selects the most relevant
information perceived through its sensors. The relevance of an event comes from
the agent's concerns. Thus, for example, if an agent detects food in its environment
and if this event is relevant to its hunger concern, a goal may be generated to move
towards the food and eat it. The most relevant event causes a signal to be emitted
which, in turn, causes the relevant goal to be instantiated.
Goal generation is inuenced by the current and predicted future states of the
environment (encapsulated within an agent's plan), and the current and predicted
future strength associated with an agent's motivations. Now, an agent's perception
of its immediate environment may directly aect the strength associated with its
motivations in such a way as to lead to the generation of goals. For example,
the sudden appearance of an oncoming vehicle may cause a sudden increase in
an autonomous truck-driving agent's motivation concerned with self-preservation
which, in turn, may lead to the generation of a goal to avoid a collision. As well
as being generated in response to the agent's immediate environment, goals may
be generated in response to the agent's future predicted states of the environment
(encapsulated its current plan). For example, if an autonomous truck has generated
a sequence of actions to achieve the goal of delivering a package to a particular
destination, it can predict that it will be at that destination at some time in the
future, which may cause it to generate a goal of refuelling at that location. TheDecember 8, 2003 18:21 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE ijaitjournalrevised
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generation of goals may also be inuenced by the predicted future strength of
motivations. The truck agent may predict that, as a consequence of executing a
sequence of actions involving driving from one location to another, the motivation
conserve-fuel will increase in strength. This may cause the agent to generate a goal
to replenish fuel with a deadline coinciding with the point at which the motivation
is predicted to reach the threshold leading to goal generation.
In addition, the relative importance of the various goals generated are directly
related to the strength of an agent's motivations. If a motivation is strong (and
high in relation to the goal generation threshold), any goal generated to satisfy
that motivation will also be important. Changes in motivational values may also
cause the priority associated with goals to change. For example, a truck-driving
agent may have the goal of delivering a parcel to a client; the priority associated
with the goal may change if the agent learns that the client has not paid for previous
deliveries.
When executing plans that have been created to achieve one or more goals, it
is possible that the context of an agent will change. For example, when a human
agent generates a plan to achieve the goal of attending a conference in Florida,
executing that plan means that the agent's environment and therefore its context
will change. A change in context means that new goals that are appropriate to
that particular context may be generated. For example, on a free day during the
conference, the agent may decide to visit DisneyWorld. Another way in which a
plan results in an agent's context being changed is if the agent chooses to acquire a
new skill such as learning to ice skate or, if it is a robotic agent, and has been altered
so that its capabilities are extended (such as being tted with a new gripper). The
new skill amounts to a change in the agent's capabilities which, in turn, change
the agent's context. One consequence of changing context while executing plans is
that an agent can generate plans with the purpose of changing its context | for
example, by planning a vacation or by planning to acquire new skills.
To conclude, when goals are generated, the motivations that led to their gen-
eration determine their importance or priority. As a consequence of goals having
an associated priority, it is possible to assign a value indicating the priority of each
action that contributes towards the achievement of such goals. In Section 3.3 we
discuss further how an agent is able to prioritise goals and actions on the basis
of how important they are to the agent, and how this ability aects the decisions
taken by an autonomous planning agent.
2.3. Plan Evaluation
Motivations also enable an agent to evaluate the plans generated to achieve its goals.
If a human agent executes a plan that involves walking down a dark alley in order
to achieve the goal of having some food, when imagining executing the plan, they
might experience a small rise in their level of fear. Through being able to predict
that walking down a dark alley will cause their fear to increase, they may choose anDecember 8, 2003 18:21 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE ijaitjournalrevised
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alternative plan (for example, one that involves driving to their destination). The
framework presented in this paper aims to replicate this behaviour | if one sequence
of actions (or plan) chosen to achieve some goal conicts with the motivations of an
agent, the agent might choose an alternative sequence of actions. This is decribed
in detail in Section 3.4.
3. A Continuous Planning Framework
3.1. The Basic Architecture
A continuous planning framework, illustrated in Figure 1, has been designed to be
both agent- and domain-independent and allows the agent to reectively evaluate,






























Fig. 1. The Continuous Planning/Execution Framework
Solid rectangular boxes represent the various processes in the framework that
are the focus of this research. Oval boxes represent plans (including the initial
and goal states), and the agent's motivations, which are represented as a set ofDecember 8, 2003 18:21 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE ijaitjournalrevised
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tuples: (name;value) where name is the name of the motivation, and value is the
motivational value or strength.
The framework can be viewed as a dynamic system in which the agent continu-
ally generates goals in response to its perceived current and predicted future states
of the environment as well as in response to its motivations. Each newly generated
goal has a deadline by which it must be achieved as well as a value indicating its
importance or priority. The Select goal or action process determines whether one
of the goals within a plan should be achieved or whether one of the actions should
be executed. If a goal is chosen, it is passed to a planner which plans to achieve
that goal. An important part of the planning process involves determining whether
or not goals may be achieved by their deadlines as well as assigning deadlines to
actions and subgoals. The planner generates a search space of alternatives when
planning, which requires a plan evaluation metric to select the most promising plan
for further renement (represented as Select best plan).
When a decision is made to execute an action, the Execute action component
updates the plan and the model of the current state to reect the changes that
have occurred following execution. If the actual outcome diers signicantly from
the predicted outcome (i.e. enough to undermine the plan in some way), the Recover
component is responsible for repairing the plan. In addition, as a consequence of
changes to the environment and plan following execution, the agent's motivations
may change (these are updated by the component Update motivations), which in
turn may cause new goals to be generated or existing goals to be updated. The
aim of this paper is not to provide details of generating or updating goals | others
have addressed that issue, and detailed accounts of goal generation in response to
motivations and feedback from the current plan can be found in 14;20.
3.2. Updating Motivations
The continuous planning framework of Figure 1 assumes that motivations change
only in response to physical changes that arise within an agent's environment. Such
changes, which are reected by updating the agent's initial state model, may be
caused by both the activities of the agent as well as by the activities of other
agents and physical processes occurring within the environment. For example, once
our example autonomous truck-driving agent has refuelled, the strength of the
conserve-fuel motivation drops and, while the agent drives from one city to another,
the strength of the conserve-fuel motivation increases.
It could be argued, however, that motivations might also change in response
to changes in an agent's internal state (i.e. in a planning agent, internal state is
encapsulated within the current plan representation which contains the current and
predicted future states). For example, if, during the process of planning, an agent
selects a new action to achieve a goal, the addition of this new action to the plan
can be viewed as constituting a new belief. As a consequence of believing that
at some point in the future the agent will be executing the new action (which,December 8, 2003 18:21 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE ijaitjournalrevised
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when executed, will cause the agent's motivations to change), the current strength
associated with motivations might change. For example, the autonomous truck-
driving agent may have a motivation associated with keeping busy. Adding a new
action to its current plan in order to achieve a goal causes the agent to believe that at
some point in the future it will be busier, therefore leading to an immediate decrease
in the strength associated with keeping busy. This approach is more complex to
model as the strengths of motivations will dier with respect to each plan, so
that each plan representation must include a corresponding set of motivations, as
discussed further in 4. Plan evaluation would then be more dicult as, instead of
evaluating the degree to which each plan supports the same set of motivations,
each plan supports its own, dierent set of motivations. In order to simplify the
modelling of motivations and their relationship to goal and plan generation, we
therefore assume that motivations only change in response to physical changes to
the environment (either by the agent, or by other agents and physical processes).
When the planning agent plans, its motivations remain unaected.
3.3. The Impact of Assigning Priorities to Goals
3.3.1. Introduction
When goals are generated in response to an agent's motivations, their priority or
importance is determined by the intensity or motivational value associated with the
motivations that led to their generation. Each goal is associated with a unique set
of motivations, in other words, a unique set of motivations will, once the intensity of
each motivation exceeds some threshold, cause a goal to be generated. The intensity
of each motivation in the set will determine the importance or priority of the goal
when it is generated. There are many ways of determining the importance of each
newly generated goal: the importance of a goal may be the same as the highest
intensity of its associated motivations; it may be the sum of the intensities of each
motivation associated with the goal; it may be the average of the intensities 13. For
the purpose of this paper it is not necessary to choose how the importance of a
goal might be calculated, it is only necessary to know that once a goal is generated,
a value indicating its importance is calculated. This means it is possible to decide
which goals are more important than others.
One of the key features of an autonomous motivated planning agent is this ability
to assign priorities to goals as it enables the agent to perform two operations: the
rst involves deciding which goals to focus upon, deciding whether to achieve a goal
or to execute an action, or deciding which action to execute (Select goal or action);
the second involves choosing which goals to abandon, should there be insucient
time available to achieve all goals. These two operations are described in more detail
in the following sections.December 8, 2003 18:21 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE ijaitjournalrevised
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3.3.2. Choosing whether to plan or whether to execute
Planning is a continual process as new goals may be generated at any time in re-
sponse to changes in both the agent's motivations and the external environment.
The autonomous planning agent must therefore interleave planning with execu-
tion which means it must decide periodically whether to plan to achieve a goal or
whether to execute an action | this choice is determined by the Select goal or
action component of Figure 1. If the autonomous planning agent chooses to plan
it must choose which goal to achieve, while if it chooses to execute it must decide
which action to execute. To facilitate this, all goals and actions are assigned values
indicating their priority or importance.
When goals are generated in response to changes in the agent's motivations
and external environment, each goal is assigned a value indicating its priority as
discussed above. This means that during the planning process, actions which con-
tribute to those goals (i.e. actions that have been selected to achieve the goal) are
also assigned a value indicating their priority. If an action contributes to a single
goal, the action inherits the value indicating the importance of that goal. If the
action contributes to more than one goal, it is assigned the sum of the values indi-
cating the importance of each goal. (There are many ways of assigning priorities to
actions; they could be assigned the value of the goal of maximum importance, or
they could be assigned the value indicating the average importance.) Preconditions
of actions have the same priority as their associated action. For example, Figure 2
shows a partial plan containing three goals, g1, g2 and g3 with actions a1;:::;a7.
Arrows indicate ordering constraints, so action a4 occurs before a1 which occurs
before g1. Actions a1 and a4 contribute only towards g1 and so inherit the value
indicating the importance assigned to g1, namely the value 6. Actions a6 and a7,
however, contribute towards the goals g1, g2 and g3, and so are assigned the sum
of the values indicating the importance of goals g1, g2 and g3, namely the value 23.
In addition to taking into account the importance or priority associated with
goals or actions, the component Select goal or action also takes into account the
deadlines associated with goals and actions when deciding whether to plan or
whether to execute. When goals are generated they are assigned a deadline (a value
indicating the time by which they must be satised) along with a value indicating
their priority. The planning process, in addition to assigning values indicating the
importance of actions, also calculates the deadline by which the preconditions of an
action must be true in order that the goal to which the action contributes may be
satised by its deadline (this is discussed further in Section 3.3.4). For example, if
a goal is to be achieved by 3pm, and an action that takes 30 minutes is selected to
achieve that goal, the preconditions of that action must be made true by 2.30pm.
In conclusion, the component Select goal or action chooses whether to achieve
a goal or whether to execute an action by taking into account the priority and
deadline associated which each goal or action. Only actions whose preconditions
are true in the current state may be considered for execution. Goals or actions withDecember 8, 2003 18:21 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE ijaitjournalrevised
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Fig. 2. The importance and goals assigned to actions
high priority and imminent deadlines are preferred over those with lower priority
and deadlines that are not imminent. The ability to assign priorities to goals and
actions can therefore be seen to have a considerable impact on the decision-making
behaviour of the autonomous planning agent. In the following section we describe
how the agent can use this ability to abandon goals should there be insucient
time available to achieve all goals by their deadlines.
3.3.3. Editing Plans
In order to describe the impact that assigning importance to goals has with re-
gard to abandoning goals should there be insucient time available to achieve all
goals, we present the component Plan to achieve goals of Figure 1 in more detail,
as shown in Figure 3. Whenever a goal (together with values indicating its impor-
tance and deadline) is selected by the Select action or goal component, it is passed
to an AI planner, Achieve goal which generates a plan to achieve that goal. The
implementation of this component is based on the partial order planning paradigm
(see 17;22;29) with various extensions which will be described later in Section 3.3.4.
As part of the plan generation process, deadlines are estimated and assigned to all
actions and their associated preconditions or subgoals | this is the responsibility of
the component Estimate deadlines. If there is not enough time to achieve all of the
goals in the plan by their deadlines, the plan is edited to remove those goals with
low priority or low values indicating their importance, (see Edit the plan). Once the
plan has been edited, new deadlines are estimated and assigned to actions and their
subgoals. The process is complete when deadlines have successfully been assigned
to all actions and their subgoals.December 8, 2003 18:21 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE ijaitjournalrevised







Plan to achieve goal
Fig. 3. Planning to achieve a goal
The Plan to achieve goal component of the continuous planning framework was
implemented using an extended partial order planning paradigm for several reasons.
Firstly, partial order planners output plans that oer a higher degree of execution
exibility than those generated by Graphplan style 3 and state search planners 10
and so are more suitable for frameworks in which planning and execution are in-
terleaved 19. In addition, partial order planners require only minor modications
to deal with the requirement that new goals may be generated continually during
the planning process, as the new goals are simply added to the set of outstanding
goals without aecting the planning process. Graphplan style planners, in contrast,
would have to recommence the plan extraction process to take the new goals into
account. Finally, Smith 27 argues that partial order planners oer a more promis-
ing approach for handling domains with durative actions, temporal and resource
constraints. However, until recently, a signicant drawback of partial order plan-
ning has been the lack of a good heuristic for selecting plans for further renement
as search control is of fundamental importance for partial order planning | work
by 19;29 challenges the prevailing pessimism about the scalability of partial order
planning by presenting novel heuristic control techniques.
When humans generate and execute plans to achieve their aims or goals, they
often nd that there will not be sucient time available to achieve all of their
goals. Instead of rejecting their plans and replanning from scratch, they may choose
instead to abandon one or more of their goals, thereby freeing time which canDecember 8, 2003 18:21 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE ijaitjournalrevised
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be used to fulll their other goals. In contrast, classical temporal planners will
simply fail if there is insucient time available to achieve all goals. One of the
objectives when designing the continuous planning/execution framework was to
give the autonomous planning agent the ability to emulate this aspect of human
decision-making | namely the ability to remove one or more goals (together with
their associated actions and constraints) from a plan once it has been determined
that there is insucient time available to achieve all of the goals in that plan. By
editing a plan it is possible to preserve as much of the original plan as possible in
contrast to replanning from scratch. However, this approach has various associated
costs | in particular, it is necessary during the planning process to maintain a
record of the dependencies between actions and goals to facilitate plan editing.
This can be seen in Figure 2 where each action contains a record of the goals to
which it contributes (for example a5 and a2 contribute towards the goals g1 and g2
while a4 and a1 contribute solely towards the goal g1). In addition, once a plan has
been edited, deadlines have to be reassigned to the remaining actions in the plan,
and, if there is still insucient time available, the cycle of editing and reassigning
deadlines is repeated. An alternative approach would be to simply replan from
scratch once it is established that there is insucient time available to achieve all
goals, by presenting only a subset (selected by taking into account the priorities and
deadlines of each goal) of the original set of goals to the planner. In the future it is
intended to perform a set of experiments to determine whether or not the decision
to edit the plan is more or less ecient than replanning from scratch. If replanning
from scratch proves to be less costly, some of the main benets of partial order
planning such as being able to plan to achieve goals using a skeletal partial order
plan, will be lost.
3.3.4. Summary
In this section we describe how the partial order planning paradigm (the component
Achieve goal in Figure 3) has been extended in order to: support the autonomous
agent in choosing whether to plan or whether to act; enable the autonomous plan-
ning agent to abandon one or more goals should there be insucient time available
to achieve all goals; allow the autonomous planning agent to choose the preferred
plan for subsequent renement.
 In order to enable the autonomous planning agent to choose whether to plan or
whether to act, all actions and goals are assigned values indicating their priority
as described in Section 3.3.2 above.
 If there is insucient time available to achieve all goals (this is determined by
the Estimate deadlines component), the plan is edited to remove goals of low
importance or priority. In order to edit the plan, a record must be kept of the
dependencies that exist between actions and goals. Currently, each action con-
tains a list of the goals to which they contribute as shown in Figure 2. When aDecember 8, 2003 18:21 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE ijaitjournalrevised
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goal is removed from the plan, all actions and constraints that contribute towards
that goal (provided they do not contribute towards the achievement of any other
goals) are also removed.
 A key requirement of the autonomous planning agent is that it has the ability
to reason about whether or not there is sucient time available to achieve goals
by their deadline. In order to support this requirement, when creating a new
action or further instantiating an existing action in order to achieve a goal it is
necessary to estimate the duration of that action. The duration of an action may
depend upon the values assigned to its parameters. For example, the duration
assigned to an instance of the operator schema drive-to(?x, ?y) will depend upon
the values assigned to the variables ?x and ?y. In this case, the exact duration can
only be determined when both ?x and ?y have been instantiated. In the current
implementation of the framework, a worst case estimate of the duration of each
incomplete action instantiation is provided, which requires a degree of domain
knowledge. For example, if the domain contains a network of locations within a
town, the worst case estimate of the duration associated with instances of the
drive-to(?x, ?y) would be the time taken to travel between the two furthest apart
locations.
 Actions are assigned values indicating the degree to which they support the
agent's motivations (for further details see 4) | this discussed further in Section
3.4. In the implementation a look-up table containing such values is used.
The above extensions enable us to show how the autonomous planning agent
is able to use priorities associated with goals to both decide whether to plan or to
execute and to abandon the achievement of one or more goals if there is insucient
time available. In the following section we describe how the last extension enables
motivations to be used to evaluate plans thereby allowing the autonomous planning
agent to select its favourite plan for further renement.
3.4. Using Motivations to Evaluate Plans
In planning to achieve a goal, a planning agent generates a search space of alter-
native plans and, at each stage of the planning process, must apply a heuristic to
select the most promising plan for further renement (see Select best plan in Fig-
ure 1). In this section, an approach based upon examining the degree to which each
plan supports or undermines the agent's motivations is discussed.
We start by elaborating the truck-driving agent example we have been using
throughout this paper, based on the DriverLog domain (used in the 3rd Inter-
national Planning Competition) in order to illustrate how an agent's motivations
aect the way it both generates goals and plans.
Figure 4 shows the topology of the domain, which consists of ve cities con-
nected by roads. The numbers indicate the distance from one city to another. It is
the task of a truck-driving agent to transport packages or parcels from one city to
another by some deadline. At any point in time, the truck-driving agent may receiveDecember 8, 2003 18:21 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE ijaitjournalrevised
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an instruction to collect a package from one city, and to transport it to another
city by a xed deadline. In order to achieve its goals in an intelligent timely man-
ner, the truck-driving agent requires the continuous planning/execution framework









Fig. 4. The Driver Log Domain
Each time an agent executes an action within its environment, its motivations
are updated to reect the fact that it has brought about changes to its environ-
ment. For example, as a consequence of having driven between City 1 and City
2, the motivation associated with conserving fuel will increase in strength reect-
ing the decrease in fuel. This means that there is a dierence between the current
strength associated with the agent's motivations and the future strength of those
motivations once the agent has executed some sequence of actions. The degree to
which the actions within a plan support the agent's motivations can be determined
by predicting the future motivations of the agent that arise as a consequence of ex-
ecuting those actions. This enables the planning agent to choose a plan containing
the sequence of actions that best support the motivations, i.e. a plan containing
the sequence of actions favoured by the agent.
In order to represent the degree to which each action may support or undermine
motivations, the action representation has been extended to include two elds,
pros and cons, where each contains a set of tuples (name;strength) representing
the name of each motivation supported/undermined by the action, together with
the degree (strength) to which executing the action will support or undermine
the motivation. Currently, these values are stored in a look-up table, requiring
knowledge about the domain in which the planning agent is acting. For example,
the action drive-truck(truck city1 city2) in Figure 5 has the associated set pros
consisting of the tuples ((pleasure, 0.1)) and the associated set cons consisting of
tuples (conserve-fuel, 1.2), (conserve-tyres 1.0)), so that when driving from City 1
to City 2, the truck-driving agent supports pleasure to a small extent (value 0.1),
and undermines conserve-fuel and conserve-tyres to a greater extent (the road may
be busy with trac and full of pot-holes).
One diculty with associating pros and cons with each action instance is that
specic domain knowledge is required to provide the correct instantiation. For ex-December 8, 2003 18:21 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE ijaitjournalrevised
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(:action drive-truck
:parameters (truck city1 city2)
:condition (and (connects city1 city2)
(at truck city1)
(has-fuel truck))






Fig. 5. A drive-truck action.
ample, an action representing the activity of eating a meal in a restaurant, dine
(?restaurant) may support the same motivations to a greater or lesser degree de-
pending upon which restaurant is selected during planning to instantiate the vari-
able ?restaurant. For example, if the chosen restaurant is expensive, dining there
will undermine the motivation save-money to a greater degree than dining at a
cheaper restaurant. Likewise, the pleasure motivation may receive greater support
at a 3-star Michelin restaurant than a restaurant without a Michelin rating. In order
to overcome this, it is assumed that the agent knows the degree to which executing
each action instance supports or undermines its motivations. This assumes that the
agent has some way of both acquiring and learning this information, which is beyond
the scope of this paper. The implementation of the continuous planning/execution
framework has a look-up table containing instantiations of the elds pros and cons
for each action instance. The instantiation of the elds pros and cons of each action
instance is performed by the component Achieve goal as described in Section 3.3.4
above.
Though many plan evaluation functions to determine the degree to which actions
in a plan support an agent's motivations are possible, one simple example, used in














Here, FM is the sum of the values indicating the predicted future strength asso-
ciated with each of the agent's motivations i; n is the total number of motivations;
valuei is a measure of the current strength associated with each motivation i; p is
the number of actions in the plan; strengthprosj is the degree to which each action
j in the plan the supports motivation i (i belongs to a tuple in the set pros associ-
ated with action j); strengthconsj is the degree to which each action j undermines
motivation i. As indicated above, this is just one particular way of evaluating the
degree to which a sequence of actions (or plan) supports an agent's motivations.December 8, 2003 18:21 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE ijaitjournalrevised
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There are many other ways of evaluating this support and future work will involve
investigating which method is the more eective. Plans with a low value of FM are
preferred as they support the agent's motivations to a greater degree than those
with high FM.
In the truck-driving domain, the agent that is initially located in City 1 is given
the task of delivering a package to a destination in City 5. The three alternative
routes generated in three dierent plans involve: driving from City 1 via City 2
to City 5; driving from City 1 via City 2 and City 4 to City 5; and driving from
City 1 via City 3 and City 4 to City 5. Table 1 indicates the degree to which each
action instance supports or undermines the pleasure, conserve-fuel and conserve-
tyres motivations. Now, a standard plan evaluation function might simply take into
account the number of steps in a plan | in this case, the rst route (via City
2 to City 5) is preferred as it has the least number of steps. By contrast, a plan
evaluation function that minimises the distance travelled in each plan will choose
the second plan as the total distance travelled is 9 units. Finally, however, if we
assume that the initial motivational value associated with pleasure, conserve-fuel
and conserve-tyres is 0.0 then, using the function described above, the preferred
plan is the third plan with FM of -3.1 (FM for the rst plan is 3.8 and for the
second is 0.3).
Table 1. pros and cons associated with action in-
stances (c1, c2, etc. are abbreviations for City 1, City
2, etc.)
action pros cons
drive(c1 c2) (pleasure 0.1) (cons-fuel 1.2)
(cons-tyres 1.0)
drive(c1 c3) (pleasure 1.9) (cons-fuel 0.3)
(cons-tyres 0.1)
drive(c2 c5) (pleasure 0.2) (cons-fuel 1.0)
(cons-tyres 0.9)
drive(c2 c4) (pleasure 1.2) (cons-fuel 0.3)
(cons-tyres 0.2)
drive(c4 c5) (pleasure 1.8) (cons-fuel 0.3)
(cons-tyres 0.4)
drive(c3 c4) (pleasure 1.2) (cons-fuel 0.3)
(cons-tyres 0.4)
4. Discussion and Conclusions
It is interesting to note the dierent results obtained depending on the plan evalua-
tion mechanism. It should be clear that the plan evaluation function FM in Eq. (1)
is not eective if it is used in isolation to guide the search for solutions to planning
problems, as it is a poor measure of progress in achieving the goals in a plan. In
experimental trials, FM was found to be useful in combination with an evaluationDecember 8, 2003 18:21 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE ijaitjournalrevised
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heuristic that minimised the number of actions and outstanding goals. A complete
case-study and full details of our initial experimental results are available in 4.
A key aspect of goals and motivations is their dynamic organisation, which oers
much scope for further elaboration of the mechanisms proposed. One limitation
of the evaluation function FM described in the previous section is that it treats
each motivation as being equal in importance to the autonomous planning agent. In
practice, the autonomous planning agent may prefer to support one motivation more
than another. For example, if the truck-driving agent has an urgent delivery deadline
to meet, it would not be interested in trying to support the pleasure motivation by
choosing a route it enjoys. Likewise, it may not be so concerned with conserving
fuel. The relative importance of each motivation varies with dierent circumstances,
but this issue is not currently implemented and requires further examination. In
addition, plan evaluation should take into account the number of high priority
goals achieved | a plan that achieves a small number of high priority goals may
be preferred over one that achieves a larger number of low priority goals. Again,
this has not been implemented and requires further examination.
In this paper, we have described how modelling the motivations of an agent can
aect AI planning in terms of generating goals, assigning values indicating the pri-
ority of each goal, and choosing the best plan (i.e. the plan that best supports the
agent's motivations). While others have recognised the importance of motivation
(for example Luck 15 describes how motivations can be used to bias machine discov-
ery to suit the current circumstances, and Norman 20 describes how the number of
goals being achieved at any given time can dynamically alter the motivational value
threshold aecting goal generation), there has been almost no work on the role of
motivation in plan evaluation. Our work addresses that omission, both through the
development of an conceptual model for motivated planning, and an implemented
system. While the general framework has been set with positive initial results, in-
cluding experimental trials, more remains to be done, especially in drilling down
further into aspects discussed. (One immediate avenue to explore relates to the
closer integration of separate models of goal generation and plan evaluation inde-
pendently developed by the authors, but based on the same underlying motivational
principles.) It is clear, nevertheless, that motivations can potentially provide an ap-
propriate means for concentrating attention on the salient aspects of a problem to
oer more eective planning behaviour.
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